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Abstract:  
Throughout the Obama Administration, state attorneys general (AGs) 
have collaborated on several high-profile political issues. To get a fuller 
picture of this contemporary AG activism, this article analyzes AG 
participation in lawsuits and amicus curiae briefs before the U.S. Supreme 
Court across three presidential administrations. The results suggest that AGs' 
agendas have increasingly diverged throughout the Obama Administration, 
reflecting greater vertical conflict between AGs and the federal government as 
well as horizontal conflict among AGs themselves. Several factors have 
contributed to this development, including the broader polarization of 
American politics, intensified activism among Republican AGs, and increased 
collaborations between AGs and ideological interest groups. Much as with 
partisan contestation in other venues, these AG conflicts show few signs of 
abating.  
 
Since President Obama took office in 2009, state attorneys 
general (AGs) have been among the administration's most persistent 
foes. Most famously, several AGs initiated legal challenges to the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) only minutes after 
the president signed it into law, an effort that led to the Supreme 
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Court limiting the ACA's Medicaid expansion (National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius [2012]). The ACA litigation was the 
most prominent state legal challenge to the Obama Administration, but 
it has been far from the only one. By the end of Obama's first term in 
office, Republican AGs had filed over seventy lawsuits challenging the 
administration's policies. Texas AG Greg Abbott, who only half-jokingly 
described his average day as "I go to the office. I sue the federal 
government. And then I go home," has himself led twenty-four 
lawsuits against the Obama Administration at a cost of over $2.5 
million and thousands of hours of staff time (Monro 2012; Weissert 
2012; Fernandez 2013). Meanwhile, the federal Department of Justice 
has tangled with its state counterparts in a series of lawsuits involving 
immigration policy and voting rights, and partisan AG coalitions have 
been involved in several high-profile lawsuits pertaining to politically 
controversial issues, including same-sex marriage, gun control, and 
abortion.  
These activities are of interest to federalism scholars because 
AGs' position in state government grants them an important avenue 
through which to influence national policy. Most AGs have considerable 
autonomy when it comes to developing their state's official position in 
litigation, which includes participation as both direct parties and as 
amicus curiae ("friends of the court"). Further, forty-three of the 
nation's AGs are elected statewide separately from the governor or 
other state elected offices, empowering most of them with 
considerable political independence.1 AGs have taken advantage of this 
institutional autonomy to become involved in several high-profile legal 
and political issues. As the ACA litigation illustrated, these activities 
can be a powerful form of "bottom-up federalism" that acts as a form 
of pushback on the federal government (Gamkhar and Pickerill 2012).  
Relying upon an analysis of an original dataset of AG activity in 
the U.S. Supreme Court, this article examines trends in contemporary 
AG activism. Specifically, I examine AGs' participation in lawsuits and 
on amicus brief filings in the Supreme Court from 1993 to 2013 to 
determine the extent of AG conflict and cooperation during the Obama 
Administration and the two preceding presidential administrations. This 
examination suggests that AG activity during the Obama 
Administration has become increasingly polarized, resulting in greater 
vertical conflict between the states and federal government as well as 
horizontal conflicts among the AGs themselves. While bipartisan 
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collaboration still occurs on some issues, Democratic and Republican 
AGs are pursing increasingly divergent agendas across a wide range of 
policy domains.  
The article proceeds as follows. I begin with a discussion of AGs 
and contemporary federalism, raising the question of how broader 
trends in American federalism might have affected the activities of the 
AGs. I then examine an original dataset of AG activism across three 
presidential administrations, finding a sharp increase in both vertical 
and horizontal conflicts during the Obama Administration. Third, I take 
a closer look at specific areas of AG conflict and cooperation since 
2009. In this section, I identify two key trends in state litigation: a 
dramatic increase in Republican AG activism as compared to the last 
Democratic presidential administration and increasing divergence in 
the ways AGs define the "state interests" they are tasked with 
representing. The fourth section suggests that the intensification of AG 
partisanship has several sources, including the broader polarization of 
the political system, the significant increase in both the quantity of and 
activism among Republican AGs, and increased collaborations between 
AGs and ideological interest groups. I conclude with suggestions about 
possible future research on contemporary AG activism.  
 
Contemporary Federalism, Polarization, and State 
Attorneys General  
 
Contemporary American federalism has been described as 
"more chaotic, complex, and contentious than ever before" (Bowling 
and Pickerill 2013: 315). States have resorted to several methods to 
complicate and push back against federal policy, including turning 
down federal grants (Nicholson-Crotty 2012), refusing to implement 
elements of "cooperative" federal programs such as Medicaid 
(Tavernise and Gebeloff 2013), and even threatening to nullify federal 
law (Schwartz 2013).  
At the heart of what Bowling and Pickerill (2013) call 
“fragmented federalism" is an intensification of partisanship and 
polarization throughout the entire American political system. Members 
of Congress are as polarized now as they have ever been in American 
history, and issue differences between Democratic and Republican 
voters are at all-time highs (Pew Research Center 2012). While until 
quite recently state politics was viewed as being more conducive to 
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compromise and bipartisanship (Krane 2007; Brownstein and 
Czekalinski 2013), state-level polarization has become much stronger. 
Following the 2012 elections, one party held the governorship and 
both chambers of the legislature in thirty-seven states, a marked 
departure from previous patterns of divided government (Balz 2013). 
This unified governance has enabled states to pursue widely divergent 
agendas on a host of issues.  
To what extent has this increased partisanship affected recent 
activities of AGs? On the one hand, it would appear that increased 
cohesion, rather than divergence, best describes contemporary AG 
activism. Beginning during the last two decades of the twentieth 
century, AGs increasingly coordinated across state lines to intervene in 
national politics. Several scholars have examined multistate 
collaboration in the Supreme Court, where states have become the 
second most active litigator after the federal government (Mather 
2003; Lindquist and Corley 2013). AGs also became active in filing 
multistate amicus curiae briefs on behalf of their states (Provost 2011; 
Waltenburg and Swinford 1999; Kearney and Merrill 2000; Nicholson-
Crotty 2007). Further, as Colin Provost has documented, AGs have 
actively coordinated their efforts to bring consumer protection lawsuits 
against prominent national corporations (Provost 2003; Provost 2006). 
In February 2012, for example, all of the nation's AGs signed a $26 
billion agreement with the six largest national banks, concluding their 
investigation of the mortgage crisis of the late 2000s (Schwartz and 
Dewan 2012).  
On the other hand, contemporary AG activities appear to reflect 
fragmented federalism in several key ways. First, AGs have engaged in 
a considerable amount of vertical conflict by challenging the federal 
government and pursuing policy goals opposite to those sought by 
their federal counterparts in the Department of Justice. The use of 
judicial avenues to challenge the federal government is nothing new,2 
but AGs became more willing to coordinate their challenges against 
federal policy during the Reagan Administration (Clayton 1994). AGs 
became especially active during the George W. Bush Administration, 
when several criticized "regulatory gaps" in the Bush Administration's 
approach to prescription drug regulation, antitrust enforcement, 
financial regulation, and prevention of climate change. In addition to 
using settlements with national industries to help fill these alleged 
"regulatory gaps," AGs also sued federal agencies in attempts to force 
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them to take a stronger regulatory approach (Scheberle 2005). This 
vertical conflict has been very much present during the Obama 
Administration, perhaps best exemplified by AG-led lawsuits 
challenging the Affordable Care Act.  
Also important have been two forms of horizontal conflict 
involving disputes among the AGs themselves. First, AGs have 
sometimes opposed one another directly in court. This can occur when 
policy choices in some states produce spillover effects affecting the 
interests of other states (Zimmerman 2011) or when AGs otherwise 
disagree with one another about the proper outcome of a legal 
dispute. Second, partisanship can generate additional conflict among 
AGs. In addition to most AGs having independence from other state-
level political actors, all of them are either members of the Democratic 
or Republican Party. As other scholars have demonstrated, this 
partisanship can be an important part of AG decision-making (Spill, 
Licari, and Ray 2001; Provost 2011).  
 
State Litigation across Three Presidential 
Administrations  
 
Previous scholarship on AGs describes these actors as taking on 
more activist roles over time, but have any new trends in AG activism 
emerged during the Obama Administration? To help identify possible 
trends in AG conflict and cooperation, I examined multistate AG 
activism in the U.S. Supreme Court across the three most recent 
presidential administrations. While participation in lawsuits before the 
nation's highest court is only one of several forms of contemporary AG 
activism,3 it is one of the most important ways in which AGs seek to 
have a national impact on public policy. This participation primarily 
occurs in one of two ways: either as direct litigants or as amicus 
curiae. Both of these avenues allow AGs to determine the official 
position of their states in what are often high profile legal and political 
disputes.  
My data collection included all cases from 1993 to 2013 in which 
multiple AGs filed a brief to the U.S. Supreme Court as either direct 
litigants or amici.4 This included AG participation during both the 
certiorari and merits stages of a case. To collect this data, I employed 
a search of the U.S. Supreme Court Briefs database available through 
Lexis-Nexis.5 Because my interest is in the number of cases involving 
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AG participation rather than the sheer number of AG briefs filed, I 
counted multiple briefs filed in one case only once for the purpose of 
this analysis. Therefore, cases in which states first filed a brief at the 
certiorari stage and again during the merits stage were counted only 
once.6 This search resulted in 845 Supreme Court cases from 1993 
through 2013 attracting multistate AG participation.7  
After identifying each of the cases, I then determined whether 
each case involved vertical conflicts (between the states and federal 
government) or horizontal conflicts (among the states themselves). 
Cases were coded as involving vertical conflicts if the federal 
government, typically through the Department of Justice, participated 
in the case by opposing the interests of any of the AGs involved. I also 
determined the prevalence of two types of horizontal conflicts among 
AGs. The first were cases in which groups of AGs engaged in direct 
conflict by taking opposing positions in the case. The second group of 
cases included those that, while not involving direct conflicts among 
AGs, involved clear partisan behavior by either Republican or 
Democratic AGs. For the purposes of this analysis, I considered AG 
briefs "partisan" in nature if Republican or Democratic AGs constituted 
at least 80 percent of the AGs participating in the brief.8  
The results suggest a strong upward trend in both vertical and 
horizontal conflict during the Obama Administration. Figure 1 
illustrates the number of cases involving vertical conflict between AGs 
and the federal government. Figure 2 includes the number of 
horizontal conflicts in which AGs either opposed one another directly or 
collaborated only on partisan briefs.  
[Figure 1 here] 
[Figure 2 here] 
The large spike in these conflicts during 2013 reflects that many of the 
cases that had been percolating in the lower courts finally reached the 
Supreme Court during this year. Overall, AGs opposed the federal 
government's position in fifty-nine Supreme Court cases from 2009 
through 2013, which already nearly surpasses the number of such 
cases during the entire Clinton Administration and is likely to soon 
exceed the total number during the George W. Bush years.9 Similarly, 
horizontal conflicts among AGs have also intensified. Seventy-five 
cases have involved partisan participation among AGs during the 
Obama Administration, and AGs have directly opposed each other in 
twenty-one cases during this time. Both of these totals already surpass 
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the totals for the eight years of the Clinton presidency and are close to 
the totals for the entire George W. Bush Administration.10  
 
AG Conflicts and Cooperation during the Obama 
Administration  
 
Which issues have generated the most intergovernmental 
conflict and which areas still generate cooperation among the AGs? To 
help answer this question, I categorized the cases in the dataset based 
on the nature of the conflicts involved. The most contentious set of 
cases were those involving both vertical and horizontal conflicts, 
indicating divisions between AGs and the federal government as well 
as among AGs themselves. Other cases involved only one type of 
conflict: either horizontal conflicts among AGs in cases not involving 
the federal government or vertical conflicts in which states provided a 
united front in opposition to the federal government. A final category 
of cases involved cooperation rather than conflict, including cases in 
which AGs formed bipartisan coalitions on a single side of the case. 
Many of these cases also involved AG cooperation with the federal 
Department of Justice.  
Table 1 indicates the frequency of each of these four groups of 
cases during the Obama Administration.  
[Table 1 here] 
Below, I provide a brief overview of the sorts of issues involved 
in each of the four basic forms of conflict and cooperation represented 
in Table 1. To assist in this effort, I turned to the U.S. Supreme Court 
database to collect information about the types of issues involved in 
each of the 845 cases in the dataset.11  
 
Areas Involving both Vertical and Horizontal Conflicts  
 
The greatest amount of intergovernmental conflict occurs when 
divisions exist both between the states and the federal government as 
well as among the states themselves. This category of cases has 
grown considerably over time. About 18 percent of all Supreme Court 
cases attracting AG participation during the Obama Administration fell 
into this category, as compared to only 6 percent during the Clinton 
Administration and 12 percent during the George W. Bush 
Administration. Further, this category described over 37 percent of the 
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cases in 2013. These cases have tended to involve partisan conflict 
over federal statutes and regulations, though they have also involved 
constitutional disputes concerning controversial state laws.  
The most prominent of the cases in this category occurring 
during the Obama Administration have involved the Affordable Care 
Act. An all-Republican coalition of AGs initiated the challenges to both 
the Medicaid expansion and the individual mandate provisions of the 
ACA that ultimately led to NFIB v. Sebelius (2012). Another all-
Democratic coalition of AGs opposed these efforts by filing amicus 
briefs in support of these ACA provisions. Private party challenges to 
the ACA's contraceptives mandate likewise attracted partisan AG 
amicus participation on both sides of the issue (Conestoga Wood 
Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius [cert. granted]; Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores [cert. granted]).  
Environmental policy, particularly concerning air pollution 
regulation, has also generated considerable vertical and horizontal 
conflict since 2009. Much of the litigation has focused on the 
regulatory fallout from the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts 
v. Environmental Protection Agency (2007) and subsequent Obama 
Administration actions to combat climate change. When the EPA 
announced in December 2009 that carbon dioxide was a pollutant that 
endangered human health, several Republican AGs filed suit to 
overturn the finding (Tresaugue 2010; Cook 2010). This spurred 
sixteen other AGs, all but one Democrats, to intervene in these cases 
on behalf of the Obama EPA's position and against their Republican AG 
counterparts (Massachusetts Attorney General's Office 2010). The 
EPA's subsequent attempts to implement climate change regulation 
have also featured sharp conflicts among Democratic and Republican 
AGs (Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA [cert. granted]). Cases 
involving environmental issues other than climate change have 
likewise generated both vertical and horizontal conflicts, including acid 
rain control (EPA v. EME Homer City Generation [cert. granted]), 
regulation under the Clean Water Act (Sackett v. EPA [2012]; Mingo 
Logan Coal Co. v. EPA [cert. petition pending]), forest conservation 
(Wyoming v. U.S. Dept of Agriculture [cert. denied]), and federal 
approval of increased ethanol blending in gasoline (Grocery 
Manufacturers' Association v. EPA [cert. denied]).  
Several high profile disputes over controversial social issues also 
fall into this category of intense intergovernmental conflict. Partisan 
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coalitions of Republican AGs have opposed the Obama Administration's 
position in cases involving gay rights (Hollingsworth v. Perry [2013]; 
United States v. Windsor [2013]), immigration (Arizona v. United 
States [2012]), gun control (Abramski v. United States [cert. 
granted]; Montana Shooting Sports Association v. Holder [cert. 
denied]), buffer zones around abortion clinics (McCullen v. Coakley 
[cert. granted]), and voting rights (Shelby County v. Holder [2013]; 
Arizona v. Inter-Tribal Council of Arizona [2013]). Several of these 
cases have prompted partisan coalitions of Democratic AGs to counter-
mobilize in opposition to their Republican colleagues.  
 
Areas Involving Only Horizontal Conflict  
 
Another set of cases, while not involving the federal 
government, has nevertheless generated significant horizontal conflict 
among the AGs. These cases, representing 17 percent of all cases 
attracting AG involvement during the Obama Administration, tend to 
involve the constitutionality of highly contentious state laws.  
Affirmative action policies provide one prominent example. Partisan 
groups of AGs filed opposing briefs in a case involving whether 
Michigan's state constitutional ban of affirmative action violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Schuette v. Coalition 
to Defend Affirmative Action [cert. granted]). In Fisher v. University of 
Texas (2013), a group of nearly all Democratic AGs filed a brief in 
favor of the constitutionality of the university's affirmative action 
program, which followed Republican Texas AG Greg Abbott's refusal to 
defend the university's race-conscious program in the Supreme Court 
(Von Spakovsky 2013). Sharp horizontal conflicts have also been 
prominent in cases concerning other hot-button issues such as gun 
control (McDonald v. Chicago [2012]), abortion (Horne v. Isaacson 
[cert. denied]), and religion (Christian Legal Society v. Martinez 
[2010]; Salazar v. Buono [2010]; Town of Greece v. Galloway [cert. 
granted]).  
This category of cases has also involved AG disagreement on 
issues pertaining to class actions and private litigants' access to the 
courts. Two of the most important class action cases in recent years 
both featured partisan groups of AGs taking opposing positions in the 
litigation. In Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles (2013), which 
dealt with the right of a company sued by class action litigants to 
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remove the case from state to federal court, an all-Republican AG 
coalition filed an amicus brief in favor of the company, raising concerns 
about "the use of novel class-action procedures to abridge the rights of 
their citizens" (Brief of Alabama, et al. 2012). Meanwhile, three 
Democratic AGs filed a brief on the opposing side, arguing that 
removing the class action to federal court would harm "the ability of 
their citizens to adjudicate controversies within their own jurisdiction" 
(Brief of Arkansas, et al. 2012). Similarly, partisan groups of AGs took 
opposing positions in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion (2011), which 
involved whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempted state contract 
law prohibiting the use of certain arbitration clauses in consumer 
contracts.  
 
Areas Involving Only Vertical Conflict  
 
A third category of cases involves those in which states present 
a united front in opposition to the federal government. While this type 
of case may be the first to come to mind when discussing 
intergovernmental conflicts, they in fact constitute a small and 
shrinking percentage of intergovernmental conflict. This category 
represented about 15 percent of all cases in the dataset during the 
Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations, but described only 9 
percent of the cases during the first five years of the Obama 
Administration. Especially common in this grouping of cases were 
those involving federal preemption and sovereign immunity.  
In National Meat Association v. Harris (2012), for example, a 
bipartisan AG coalition joined with California AG Kamala Harris in 
defending a state law regulating the treatment of animals in 
slaughterhouses. The Obama Administration opposed the states' 
position, arguing that the Federal Meat Inspection Act expressly 
preempted California's law. Other preemption cases have also involved 
bipartisan AG coalitions opposing the federal government's position 
(Wos v. E.M.A. [2013]; Montana v. U.S. Department of the Treasury 
[cert. denied]). Sovereign immunity cases, which involve whether 
states can be sued without their consent, have also involved bipartisan 
groups of AG aligned against the United States' position (Sossamon v. 
Texas [2011]; Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart 
[2011]).  
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Other federalism-related issues have generated vertical-only 
conflicts in the Supreme Court, such as whether state action is 
immune from federal antitrust law (North Carolina Board of Dental 
Examiners v. FTC [cert. granted]) and whether a state can refuse to 
transfer a prisoner to the custody of the United States (Chafee v. 
United States [cert. denied]). The United States and a bipartisan group 
of AGs also disputed the proper interpretation of a federal civil rights 
statute in the context of employment discrimination (University of 
Texas Medical Center v. Nassar [2013]).  
 
Areas Involving Intergovernmental Cooperation  
 
While vertical and horizontal AG conflicts have grown 
increasingly prominent throughout the Obama Administration, 
intergovernmental cooperation remains important. Indeed, over half 
(56 percent) of the cases from 2009 to 2013 involved neither vertical 
nor horizontal conflict, though only 36 percent of the cases in 2013 fell 
into this category.  
The largest area of intergovernmental cooperation involved 
criminal procedure issues. This area is consistently the single largest 
issue area attracting multistate AG participation, as about a quarter of 
all of the cases each year from 1993 through 2013 have involved 
criminal procedure issues. In addition, these cases have involved the 
least amount of AG conflict. AG participation in criminal procedure 
cases tends to be bipartisan, and participating AGs rarely oppose the 
federal government's position in these cases. Of all the cases 
designated by the U.S. Supreme Court Database as "Criminal 
Procedure" cases, only about 9 percent involved either partisan AG 
participation or direct conflicts among federal and state prosecutors. 
Even this small percentage likely overstates conflict, however, since 
the Supreme Court Database includes Second Amendment gun rights 
cases as part of this general category. Removing these cases from the 
total drops the amount of conflict to less than 7 percent of the cases.  
In addition to the cooperation present in criminal procedure 
cases, AGs have also worked on a bipartisan basis to defend their own 
ability to bring litigation in the name of their states. In Mississippi v. 
AU Optronics [2014], nearly all of the nation's AGs signed on to a brief 
supporting Mississippi AG Jim Hood's antitrust lawsuit against several 
electronics manufacturers. Hood had filed the lawsuit in state court, 
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but the manufacturers argued that the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005 (CAFA) required that the AG's lawsuit be removed to federal 
court. The AGs' ultimately successful argument was that CAFA was not 
meant to limit consumer protection lawsuits filed by AGs. The AGs' 
cooperation in AU Optronics mirrored previous bipartisan AG efforts to 
fight attempts to limit their powers to litigate in the name of their 
state, both in the Supreme Court (Cuomo v. Clearing House 
Association [2009]) and in other venues.12 Bipartisan cooperation in 
this area contrasts with the previously mentioned partisan conflict 
among AGs when the issues involve the ability of private litigants to 
sue.  
Finally, while this article focuses on AG participation in Supreme 
Court cases, it is important to note that out-of-court settlements with 
national corporations have also tended to attract strong bipartisan 
support from most or all of the nation's AGs. In addition to the $26 
billion foreclosure settlement noted earlier, AGs have reached dozens 
of consumer protection and antitrust settlements with pharmaceutical 
companies, financial firms, and others (Provost 2010; Nolette 
forthcoming).  
The existence of intergovernmental cooperation in these areas, 
however, does not necessarily mean that partisan concerns are 
irrelevant. Of the sixty-three criminal procedure cases during the 
Obama Administration involving a multistate brief, for example, a 
Republican AG served as the lead author of the brief in forty-three (68 
percent) cases. This is consistent with previous scholarship finding that 
Republican AGs were more likely to initiate amicus briefs in criminal 
procedure cases between 1990 and 2001 (Provost 2011), suggesting 
that criminal procedure issues continue to be a higher priority for 
Republican AGs. Further, even when they ultimately join legal 
settlements with corporations, Republican AGs may be more likely to 
harbor concerns about the impact of this litigation on business 
interests. Republican Oklahoma AG Scott Pruitt, for example, initially 
criticized the 2012 national foreclosure settlement as "greatly 
overreach[ing] the authority of state attorneys general" (Oklahoma 
Office of the Attorney General 2012). Previous scholarship on tobacco 
litigation, which found that Republican AGs were more hesitant to join 
the litigation out of concerns about its impact on the tobacco industry 
(Spill, Licari, and Ray 2001), suggests that Pruitt's concern is not an 
isolated one.  
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Partisan Conflict and the Definition of "State Interests"  
 
The existence of vertical and horizontal AG conflict is not an 
entirely new development. AGs took on a more regularized and 
coordinated activist role during the Reagan Administration by 
challenging the administration's priorities on environmental, consumer 
protection, and antitrust issues (Clayton 1994). Partisan splits were 
apparent in several cases during the George W. Bush Administration, 
including the litigation campaign by former New York AG Eliot Spitzer 
and other Democratic AGs to force the Bush Administration to address 
climate change (Massachusetts v. EPA [2007]).  
Nevertheless, in addition to the intensification of these conflicts, 
two new developments are particularly worth highlighting. First, 
Republican AGs have become particularly active in initiating challenges 
to federal policy. In one sense, this is not particularly surprising – after 
all, Democratic AGs aggressively challenged the Bush Administration in 
several policy areas, and Republican AGs now have the opportunity to 
push back against an administration of the opposite party. 
Nevertheless, it is notable that compared to the last time a Democrat 
occupied the White House, Republican AGs are now far more active in 
challenging the federal government and pursuing agendas quite 
different from their Democratic counterparts. In nearly all of the cases 
(96 percent) in which Republican AGs took positions opposing the 
Clinton Administration, they did so as part of a bipartisan AG coalition. 
In fact, of all of the partisan briefs AGs filed during the Clinton 
Administration, most involved Democratic AGs taking a position 
opposing the administration. Only five cases during the entire Clinton 
Administration featured multiple Republican AGs collaborating on a 
partisan brief,13 compared to forty-nine during the first five years of 
the Obama Administration alone. Following a 2012 press conference of 
nine Republican AGs who highlighted their various lawsuits against the 
Obama Administration, Texas AG Greg Abbott remarked, "There seems 
to be, in addition to the size, an intensified cohesion and collegiality 
among the [Republican] AGs. Part of it is based on personality. Part of 
it is based on sense of purpose" (Biskupic 2012). These statistics bear 
out Abbott's comment.  
A second important development has been AGs defining their 
states' interests in increasingly partisan terms, leaving fewer cases in 
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which there are clearly discernible and unified "state interests" 
conflicting with those of the federal government. Instead, AGs have 
alternated between broadly describing "state interests" as either the 
necessity of protecting state policy autonomy or upholding the 
interests of their individual citizens against government (state or 
federal) overreach, depending on the nature of the underlying policy 
dispute. The lack of consistency in these arguments suggests that AGs 
are using their structural independence and nearly exclusive control of 
over shaping their state's position in litigation to pursue their own, and 
increasingly partisan, conceptions of good public policy.  
Consider AGs' involvement in several recent high profile cases in 
the Supreme Court. In Hollingsworth v. Perry and U.S. v. Windsor, two 
prominent gay rights cases decided in 2013, separate Democratic and 
Republican AG coalitions filed amicus briefs taking an opposite position 
from one another. While both groups of AGs claimed that their status 
as their states' legal representatives gave them an interest in these 
cases, the AGs' respective positions appeared to be more about the 
policy merits of the cases and less about federalism. While 
Massachusetts AG Martha Coakley and her fellow Democratic AGs 
argued in Windsor that the federal Defense of Marriage Act "represents 
an unprecedented intrusion into an area of law that has always been 
controlled by the states," she simultaneously led a Democratic 
coalition in Hollingsworth urging a federal court to intervene and strike 
down California's Proposition 8 banning same-sex marriages 
(Massachusetts Attorney General's Office 2013). Meanwhile, a 
Republican AG coalition claimed that striking down Proposition 8 would 
"undermine the ability of states to define and regulate marriage" (Brief 
of Indiana, et al. 2013a), but on the same day many of the same 
Republican AGs filed a brief in Windsor defending a federal statute 
regulating an area of family law that had traditionally been under state 
control (Brief of Indiana, et al. 2013b).  
Recent cases concerning abortion, gun control, and affirmative 
action illustrates a similar dynamic of AGs taking positions in favor of 
limiting state policymaking authority. In McCullen v. Coakley, a 
challenge to Massachusetts's thirty-five foot "buffer zone" around 
abortion clinics, twelve Republican AGs filed an amicus brief urging the 
Court to strike down the state law because the law "exempts speakers 
likely to express favorable views about abortion" (Brief of Michigan, et 
al. 2013). Similarly, a group of AGs urged the Court to strike down a 
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local law in McDonald v. Chicago (2010), involving a challenge to 
Chicago's strict gun control law. Their interest in the case, they 
claimed, flowed from the AGs' status as fundamental "guardians of 
their citizens' constitutional rights" (emphasis added). The AGs, in 
other words, advocated for increased federal authority over state 
policymaking, all in the name of ensuring that "millions of Americans" 
are not "deprived of their Second Amendment right to keep and bear 
arms" (Brief of Texas, et al. 2009). This trend of AGs arguing in favor 
of a result that would effectively constrain state authority has also 
appeared in recent cases such as Schuette v. Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action, which featured a group of Democratic AGs opposing 
Michigan AG Bill Schuette's defense of the state's constitutional ban on 
affirmative action (Brief of California, et al. 2013).  
This dynamic is also at work behind another recent trend of AGs 
refusing to defend their own state laws against constitutional attack. 
Texas AG Greg Abbott's refusal to defend his state's affirmative action 
policy before the Supreme Court in Fisher v. University of Texas is one 
example. Other recent examples include Pennsylvania's AG declining 
to defend the state's Voter ID law on appeal (Murphy 2014) and the 
California AG's decision to refrain from defending the state's ban on 
gay marriage (Office of the California Attorney General 2013). After 
taking office following conservative AG Ken Cuccinelli's failed bid for 
Virginia's governorship, Democratic AG Mark Herring announced that 
federal courts ought to strike down his own state's gay marriage ban 
(Williams and Gabriel 2014). Several observers, including other AGs, 
have criticized these "litigation vetoes" as examples of AGs allowing 
ideological concerns to trump constitutional duties to defend state laws 
(Suthers 2014).  
The increasing polarization of AG activism has also been 
apparent in growing conflicts between AGs and other state institutions. 
Beginning shortly after AGs initiated the ACA challenges in federal 
district court, for example, several governors and state legislatures 
attempted to influence their AGs' decisions either to join or refrain 
from joining the ongoing litigation. Idaho's state legislature became 
the first of several to pass legislation purporting to require the AG to 
file a lawsuit against the ACA (J. Miller 2010), and the Georgia 
legislature even introduced articles of impeachment against the state's 
Democratic AG for refusing to join the litigation (Brown 2010). The 
Republican governors of Nevada and Mississippi both announced that 
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they were hiring special outside counsel to represent their states after 
their states' Democratic AGs had declined to do so (Wheeler 2010). 
Meanwhile, Democratic legislators criticized their states' Republican 
AGs for joining the challenge to the ACA. In Washington State, for 
example, the Democratic legislature moved to reduce Republican AG 
Rob McKenna's budget (Brunner 2010) and Seattle's city attorney 
initiated a lawsuit seeking to force McKenna's withdrawal from the 
litigation (La Corte 2010).  
 
The Sources of Intensifying AG Polarization  
 
What has contributed to the intensification of polarization 
among the AGs? Why have Republican AGs, who as a group were 
relatively muted the last time that a Democratic occupied the White 
House, taken on more activist roles? Below, I suggest four key 
contributions to these trends.  
First, and most directly, AG activism reflects intensifying 
polarization apparent elsewhere in the political system. While 
polarization increased after Republicans captured control of Congress 
in 1994, there has been a considerable surge in polarization since 
2000 (Pew Research Center 2012). This intensified polarization 
throughout the political regime has affected various institutions of 
government, including the Supreme Court (Clayton and McMillan 
2012). State governments have been no exception, as state-level 
political conflicts increasingly mirror national-level partisan splits. As 
late as George W. Bush's second term, one could speak of a distinction 
between the polarized national environment and a less polarized state-
level politics (Krane 2007). Reflecting a similar development among 
governors and other state-level institutions, however, the polarization 
on the national level appears to have trickled down to the AGs.  
Second, while groups of mostly Democratic AGs had challenged 
national-level policies adopted by Republicans during the Reagan and 
George H.W. Bush administrations, activism among Democratic AGs 
reached new heights at the end of the 1990s and into the 2000s. This, 
in turn, spurred Republican AGs to counter-mobilize. The key event 
was the tobacco litigation of the late 1990s, which was initiated by 
liberal AGs such as Louisiana's Michael Moore and Minnesota's Hubert 
Humphrey.14 All of the nation's Republican AGs eventually joined 
settlements with the tobacco industry, but not without criticism. Most 
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prominent among the critics was Republican Alabama AG William 
Pryor, who charged that the tobacco litigation was an illegitimate 
attempt to achieve "regulation through litigation" (Pryor 2001). Shortly 
after the tobacco settlement, Pryor helped establish the Republican 
Attorneys General Association (RAGA). Democrats then founded the 
Democratic Attorneys General Association in 2002, which, like RAGA, 
serves not only as a way to elect more party members but also as a 
forum to discuss partisan policy priorities. This development was a 
significant departure from AGs' traditional practice of meeting only 
under the auspices of the National Association of Attorneys General 
and regional non-partisan groups (Curriden 1999). This development 
mirrors similar trends on the state level, where the Republican and 
Democratic Governors Associations have become increasingly 
important relative to the bipartisan National Governor's Association 
(Balz 2013).  
The third major development contributing to intensifying 
polarization among the AGs is that Republicans have had much more 
success in AG elections. Democrats had long dominated this position at 
the state level, maintaining a significant majority of the AG positions 
for several decades.15 The Democrats' high point followed the 1992 
elections when they held thirty-eight of the fifty AG positions, but the 
party continued to hold a strong majority of the nation's AG seats 
throughout the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations. Since the 
start of the Obama Administration, however, Republican AGs have 
seen an influx of new members to their ranks. Reflecting the broader 
decline of divided partisan control of political institutions on the state 
level (Kurtz 2013), Republicans began winning AG elections in 
relatively conservative states long represented by Democratic AGs. 
Following Louisiana AG Buddy Caldwell's switch to the Republican Party 
in early 2011, Democrats no longer held a majority of the AG seats for 
the first time in decades.  
A fourth development is AGs' increasing willingness to 
collaborate on lawsuits with ideological interest groups. Republican 
AGs' ACA lawsuits, for example, operated in tandem with several 
lawsuits by private employers and conservative advocacy groups 
(Goldstein 2011). The National Federation of Independent Business 
held a press conference in Florida AG Bill McCollum's office announcing 
that the conservative "voice of small business" was joining the AGs' 
lawsuit in May 2010 (Sack 2010). One of the conservative litigators 
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the states retained to represent their interests in their challenge to the 
ACA, David Rivkin, has served as outside counsel to conservative AGs 
on other cases challenging the Obama Administration as well (Price 
2011). Republican AGs' use of outside counsel mirrors Democratic AGs' 
alliances with liberal advocacy groups and private class-action 
attorneys in litigation aimed at influencing national policy. 
Massachusetts's lead brief in Massachusetts v. EPA, which was 
authored by Georgetown Law professor and environmental advocate 
Lisa Heinzerling, came together only after close collaboration among 
representatives of the twenty-nine state and environmental advocacy 
group plaintiffs aligned against the EPA (Nugent 2007). AGs have also 
worked in tandem with a coalition of various unions, progressive 
advocacy groups, and class action attorneys in litigation seeking 
greater regulation of pharmaceutical companies (Nolette forthcoming).  
The alliances among ideological litigators and AGs reflects the 
broader polarization that has occurred in the legal arena, particularly 
as conservatives have exhibited greater willingness and capacity to 
use the courts to achieve conservative social policy goals (Teles 2010). 
It also reflects the benefits of collaboration for both sides. For the AGs, 
collaborating with outside groups helps the states expand the 
resources available to engage in lengthy, large-scale litigation 
campaigns. In the ACA case, for example, the NFIB served as a 
valuable litigation ally for the AGs, providing significant resources for 
the lawsuit. The organization's financial records indicated that it spent 
nearly $1.2 million on the lawsuit in 2010 alone (Needleman and Loten 
2012). These collaborations also benefit the AGs' advocacy group and 
private litigator allies in part because AG participation helps add 
legitimacy and publicity to the political concerns underlying their 
litigation. The AG coalition aligned against the ACA, for example, 
brought considerable institutional authority to the litigation. Because 
they could claim that the ACA implicated state interests, AGs also 
brought another valuable resource along with them: the ability to get 
into court. In this sense, collaborating with AGs grants advocacy 
groups easier entry to court by adding an element of standing that 
they alone may not be able to claim.  
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Conclusion  
 
The analysis in this article suggests that the rise of polarized 
politics elsewhere in the political system has been apparent in AG 
activism as well. Vertical and horizontal AG conflicts reached 
unprecedented levels during the Obama Administration as percolating 
challenges to federal policies reached the Supreme Court. This level of 
conflict is likely to continue for the remainder of Obama's presidency 
as several pending challenges reach the Court, such as a significant 
AG-led challenge to the Dodd-Frank financial regulations (Witkowski 
2013).  
Scholars have paid greater attention to AGs in light of their 
recent activism, but several potential avenues for work on these 
important state-level actors remain. While this article focuses on AG 
interventions in the U.S. Supreme Court, examining other AG activities 
would help get a more comprehensive picture of trends in AG decision-
making. AGs play an important role in state policy development, such 
as issuing opinions interpreting state law and providing guidance to 
state agencies. They also attempt to influence the judicial branch in 
state and lower federal courts, and have sought to influence Congress 
and the federal executive branch through organized sign-on letters 
and methods besides litigation. Further examining these areas of AG 
cooperation and conflict can serve to shed light on the nature of "state 
interests" in contemporary American federalism. Scholars might also 
examine the extent to which AGs are polarized relative to the 
electorates they represent, building upon existing work in this area 
pertaining to AGs and state-level actors generally (Provost 2010; Lax 
and Phillips 2011).  
Three additional areas of inquiry would be particularly fruitful. 
First, we know that AG litigation can have an important impact on 
national policy, as demonstrated by the Supreme Court adopting the 
AGs' Medicaid arguments in NFIB v. Sebelius (2012). Future work 
might build upon existing studies of AGs' impact on national policy 
(Waltenburg and Swinford 1999; Nicholson-Crotty 2007) to examine 
how AG activism has shaped American political development. Second, 
the emergence of collaborations between AGs and private ideological 
interest groups appears to be a particularly important trend. This 
article suggests that both AGs and interest groups benefit from these 
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collaborations, but little is known about how AGs have actually worked 
with private groups in their litigation campaigns.  
Finally, more work ought to explore AGs' institutional 
development over time. Previous scholarship has noted the rapid 
increase in AG capacity and professionalization among AGs beginning 
in the 1970s (Waltenburg and Swinford 1999). More recently, several 
AGs have established solicitor general positions in their offices in order 
to assist in appellate litigation. A majority of AGs now have solicitor 
general offices, most of which were added in the late 1990s and into 
the 2000s (B. Miller 2010). Further, Congress has contributed to AGs' 
development by providing grants for state-level enforcement and 
allowing AGs to enforce federal law (Lemos 2011). Closer examination 
of these contributions to AGs' institutional development can shed light 
on why AGs have become such an important political player on the 
national stage, and may help to explain patterns of activism that have 
emerged in contemporary AG practice.  
AGs have few incentives to abandon the use of collaborative 
litigation as a way to influence national policy. Multistate litigation has 
simultaneously been a way for AGs to collectively pursue a common 
policy agenda and individually raise their own political profiles (Provost 
2003; Kam 2012; Catanese 2013). The emergence of intensified 
activism among Republican AGs, which followed in the footsteps of 
Democratic AG activism during the George W. Bush Administration, 
signals an entrenchment of collaborative AG litigation as an avenue for 
partisan contestation. This suggests that these important state actors 
will likely continue to engage in law-based activism well after Obama 
leaves office.  
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Figure 1 Number of multistate cases involving vertical conflicts, 1993-2013  
 
Source: Author's calculations from data collected on Lexis-Nexis.  
 
  
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Publius: the Journal of Federalism, Vol 44, No. 3 (Summer 2014): pg. 451-474. DOI. This article is © Oxford University 
Press and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Oxford University Press 
does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express 
permission from Oxford University Press. 
28 
 
Figure 2 Number of multistate cases involving horizontal conflicts, 1993-
2013  
 
Source: Author's calculations from data collected on Lexis-Nexis. 
 
Table 1 Frequency of vertical and horizontal AG conflicts, 2009-2013 
 
Vertical Conflict Horizontal Conflict 
 Present Not Present 
Present  18%  9%  
Not Present  17%  56%  
 
 
Notes: 
1 The governor appoints the AG in Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, and Wyoming. The state legislature and state 
supreme court appoint the AGs in Maine and Tennessee, 
respectively.  
2 For example, AGs from southern states litigated against several 
federal civil rights policies during the 1960s (e.g. South Carolina 
v. Katzenbach [1966]).  
3 For example, out-of-court multistate settlements with corporations 
are also a key way in which AGs can pursue political agendas. 
AGs also engage in activism in other venues, including lobbying 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Publius: the Journal of Federalism, Vol 44, No. 3 (Summer 2014): pg. 451-474. DOI. This article is © Oxford University 
Press and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Oxford University Press 
does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express 
permission from Oxford University Press. 
29 
 
legislatures and issuing opinions guiding executive branch 
interpretation of state law.  
4 Just over half (51 percent) of these cases involved one or more AGs 
serving as direct parties to the litigation, while the remainder 
involved solely amicus participation. Note that this dataset does 
not include cases involving participation from only one AG, since 
single-state cases tend to involve state-specific issues different 
from the more nationally important issues involved in multistate 
cases. I also excluded the small handful of original jurisdiction 
cases during these years. While these cases involve state 
conflicts, they also typically involve only state-specific policy 
issues (e.g. disputes over state borders). Nevertheless, because 
of the small number of these original jurisdiction cases, 
including them would make little difference to the trends 
identified in Figure 2.  
5 I used the following search string for each year of the study in order 
to identify briefs filed by AGs: COUNSEL((attorney! w/2 
general!) or (state! w/2 attorney!) or "Atty. Gen." or "Attorney 
Gen." or "Atty. General" or "solicitor general") or (amici pre/1 
plural(states)). Because the Lexis-Nexis database includes only 
a limited number of briefs concerning petitions for certiorari in 
cases that the Court ultimately declines to review, I 
supplemented this search with a list of such cases provided by 
the Supreme Court Counsel for the National Association of 
Attorneys General, Dan Schweitzer.  
6 Additionally, I treated two other sets of cases as only one for the 
purposes of this analysis: (1) cases in which states filed 
separate sets of briefs, but on the same side of the case, and 
(2) cases involving the same legal question that were later 
consolidated into a single case by the Court.  
7 The vast majority of cases involved wide AGs participation. Over 96 
percent of the cases in the dataset involved five or more AGs, 
and over two-thirds attracted the involvement of at least fifteen 
AGs.  
8 I chose an 80 percent partisanship threshold because it provides the 
best balance between cases attracting significant bipartisan 
support and cases that might have attracted the support of one 
or two AGs from the opposite party but were nevertheless 
clearly partisan in nature. However, I also examined the data 
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using a 70, 90, and 100 percent threshold to determine 
partisanship. The trends using all of these thresholds were very 
similar to those identified in Figures 1 and 2.  
9 Vertical conflicts were present in sixty-eight and eighty-nine cases 
during the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations, 
respectively.  
10 The seventy-five partisan cases during the Obama presidency 
compares to sixty-six and eighty-six during the Clinton and 
George W. Bush years, respectively. Direct horizontal conflicts 
were present in eighteen and thirty-one cases during the two 
preceding administrations.  
11 The U.S. Supreme Court Database is available at 
http://scdb.wustl.edu/ (accessed March 11, 2014).  
12 For example, the National Association of Attorneys General 
frequently organizes "sign-on letters" sent to Congress or the 
executive branch, many of which urge policymakers not to 
preempt AG powers to enforce state consumer protection and 
antitrust laws. The list of sign-on letters is available at 
http://www.naag.org/sign-on_archive.php (accessed March 11, 
2014).  
13 The five cases were Romer v. Evans (1996) (gay rights), United 
States v. Virginia (1996) (sex discrimination), Printz v. United 
States (1997) (whether Congress can require state officials to 
regulate handgun purchases), Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. 
Shanklin (2000) (whether federal law preempts state-level 
private tort claims), and Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing 
Board (2000) (involving the contested 2000 presidential 
election).  
14 Four AGs, including Moore and Humphrey, reached individual state 
settlements with the tobacco industry separate from the forty-
six state Master Settlement Agreement in 1998.  
15 Between 1980 and 1994, Democrats controlled no fewer than thirty-
one AG positions. Apart from dropping to twenty-nine seats for 
two years after the 1994 elections, Democrats continued to 
control at least thirty seats every year until 2005.   
